spin online game After the apparent benefits to Israel of Syria’s government collapse, the best time to ensure “escalation dominance” and a non-nuclear Iran will still be while its recalcitrant enemy in Tehran is still pre-nuclear. Though Israel’s capacity for missile defense against Iran has already been demonstrated by Jerusalem, even the best active defenses could never offer Israel a reliably long-term survival substitute for apt strategies of offense. Finally because Iran maintains close security ties with an already-nuclear North Korea, Israel will have to consider that non-Islamist adversary in its “post-Syria” calculations and calibrations. Of related importance, Israel will need to determine how the fall of Russia’s surrogate in Damascus will impact Moscow’s continued support of Tehran. After the Syrian collapse, Israel’s nuclear strategy will remain relevant to Iranian non-nuclear threats. Determining variously precise levels of strategic relevance, however, would be difficult in periods of active warfare. During such bewildering periods, Israeli determinations would depend significantly on “soft” explanatory factors such as Iranian leadership rationality and the anticipated destructiveness of Iran-inflicted non-nuclear harms. Moreover, this critical dependence would apply to Iranian first-strike attacks, retaliatory attacks and counter-retaliatory attacks. Variously intersecting issues will need to be considered in Jerusalem. It would be capricious to argue that Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture should necessarily parallel prospective Iranian destructiveness (closely or partially) or that Iranian non-nuclear threats (whether singly by Iran, Iran-based interstate alliances (including North Korea) or Iran-terror-group “hybrids” should be symmetrically countered. Only one thing is certain: appearances will be unreliable predictors. At first glance, a “symmetry hypothesis” could seem to make perfect sense. But strategic truth is excruciatingly complex and could quickly or incrementally prove indecipherable. Because virtually all Israel-related nuclear scenarios would be (i.e., without determinable precedent), nothing of any scientific value could be extrapolated. Concerning Israeli nuclear decision-makers’ usable probabilities, all they could reasonably be asked to accept would be competing iterations of subjective belief. Israel’s core strategies will still need to be informed by refined philosophies of science. In this primary obligation, meaningful assessments of hypotheses concerning “asymmetrical nuclear deterrence” and Israeli national security will need to be founded on formal deductive examinations This unchallengeable imperative indicates that Israeli intelligence assessments devoid of verifiable empirical content could still be usefully predictive. Even in the midst of future war with Iran, these assessments should be supportable by immutably basic standards of logic-based assessment: internal consistency, thematic interconnectedness and dialectical reasoning. A good place for Israeli strategists to accelerate time-urgent investigations would be within the “grey area” of Iranian non-nuclear threats that are unconventional. Most obvious would be credible enemy threats of biological warfare, biological terrorism and/or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. While non-nuclear by definition, biological warfare attacks could produce grievously injurious or near-existential event outcomes for Israel. Apart from science-based expectations of significant human harms, biological warfare attacks would likely have material impact on public fears and national decisions. Similar impacts could be expected from different scenarios involving EMP ordnance. Israeli policies of calibrated nuclear reprisal for biological warfare (BW) attacks could exhibit compelling deterrent effectiveness against certain limited types of adversary. Such policies would be inapplicable against any threats issuing from terror groups that function alone, i.e., without recognizable state alignments. In such residual cases, Israel, lacking any operational targets more suitable for nuclear targeting, would need to “fall back” on the more usual arsenals of counter-terrorist methods. In the future, such a tactical retrogression would be required even if the particular terror group involved had revealed believable nuclear threat capabilities. Because such terrorists could identify personal death as a sanctifying expression of religious martyrdom Israeli planners might have to draw upon continuously mutating psychological assessments. What about Iranian conventional threats that would involve neither nuclear nor biological hazards, but be massive enough to produce near-existential harms? As a conventional aggressor, Iran could reasonably calculate that Jerusalem would make good on some identifiable portion of its nuclear threats. Here, however, Israel’s nuclear deterrent threat credibility would be dependent on variously antecedent or coinciding shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” (the so-called “bomb in the basement”) to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Additional nuances will require correlative Israeli decisions. As a direct consequence of diminished nuclear ambiguity, Jerusalem should signal its Iranian adversary that Israel would wittingly cross the nuclear retaliatory threshold to prevent any acts of existential or near-existential aggression. Using more expressly military parlance, Israel’s immediate shift to apt forms of selective nuclear disclosure should seek to ensure the Jewish State’s success in expected struggles for “escalation dominance.” In part, the nuclear deterrence advantages for Israel of moving from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure would lie in the signal it could “telegraph” to a still non-nuclear Iran. Such a signal would warn this adversary that Jerusalem was not limited to launching retaliations that employ massive and/or disproportionate levels of nuclear force. A still-timely Israeli move from nuclear ambiguity to nuclear disclosure could improve Israel’s prospects for deterring large-scale conventional attacks with “tailored” nuclear threats. After Syria’s collapse, a not-yet-nuclear Iran might more reasonably fear certain new Israel-Sunni Arab alignments. Israeli nuclear deterrence benefits against non-nuclear threats could extend to threats of nuclear counter-retaliation. If, for example, Israel initiates the next and more protracted cycle of war with Iran – a survival-based initiative that could represent “anticipatory self-defense” under Westphalian international law – the likelihood of suffering any massive Iranian conventional retaliation might be diminished. In essence, by moving immediately from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure, Jerusalem could upgrade its overall deterrence posture vis-à-vis Iran. In protecting itself from deliberate nuclear attack, Israeli strategists should accept certain core assumptions of Iranian enemy rationality. But even if these assumptions were well-founded, there would remain variously attendant dangers of unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war. These potentially existential dangers could be produced by enemy hacking operations, computer malfunction (an accidental nuclear war) or decision-making miscalculation (whether by Iran, by Israel, or by both/all parties.) In the portentous third scenario, damaging synergies could arise that would prove extremely difficult or even impossible to halt. To an unforeseeable extent, the geo-strategic search for “escalation dominance” by all sides to a potentially nuclear conflict would enlarge the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war. These risks would include prospects of a nuclear war by accident and/or decisional miscalculation. The “solution” here could not be to simply wish-away the common search for “escalation dominance” (any such wish would be contrary to the “logic” of balance-of-power world politics), but to manage all prospectively nuclear crises at their lowest possible levels of destructiveness. Wherever feasible, it would be best to avoid such crises altogether, and to maintain in place reliable “circuit breakers” against strategic hacking or technical malfunction. In the expanding cauldron of Middle Eastern chaos, Israel will need to assess and re-assess its ties to certain Sunni Arab states. Among other things, Israeli nuclear strategists should competently re-assess the Trump-era “Abraham Accords:” Have these agreements given Israel any greater cause for security confidence, or do they enhance “peace” only where there have never been actual adversaries? And have the Abraham Accords hardened the Middle East Sunni-Shia dualism, thereby rendering Iran and its terror-surrogates an even greater threat to Israel? Though Israel has no regional nuclear adversaries at present, the steady approach of a nuclear Iran could encourage rapid nuclearization among such Sunni Arab states as Saudi Arabia, Egypt or United Arab Emirates (UAE). Following the turnover of Afghanistan to Taliban and other Islamist forces, the strengthening of al-Qaeda and ISIS offshoots in post-Assad Syria and the Pakistan cultivation of improved relations with Iran, non-Arab Pakistan could more likely become a direct adversary of Israel. Pakistan is an already nuclear Islamic state with substantial ties to China and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan, like Israel, is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. During any war with Iran, Jerusalem would need to “keep an eye” on Islamabad. “Everything is very simple in war,” says Carl von Clausewitz in “but the simplest thing is very difficult.” Longer term, salient issues of Israeli nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear threats could be impacted by Palestinian statehood To wit, while rarely mentioned in the same breath as nuclear war, the creation of Palestine could meaningfully affect Israel’s war preparations against a still non-nuclear Iran. , if Israel’s war against Iran were fought or continued after that enemy state became nuclear, the presence of a Palestinian state could negatively affect the correlation of military forces in the region. For the moment, a Palestinian state is generally “off the radar.” Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that once Palestine came into formal or existence as a sovereign state, any prior shift in Israel’s nuclear strategy from to would reduce Israel’s Jerusalem’s incentive to war against Iran. This expectation could make strategic sense only if Israel were first willing to believe that its nuclear deterrent threat, as a determinable consequence of this shift, was being taken with greater seriousness by Iran. Several corollary problems will soon need to be considered. First, how would Israel’s leadership actually that taking its bomb out of the “basement” had improved its nuclear deterrence posture regarding Iran? To an unpredictable extent, the credibility of Jerusalem’s nuclear threats would be contingent upon the variable severity of different provocations. It might prove believable if Israel were to threaten nuclear reprisals for provocations that endanger the physical survival of the state, but it would almost certainly be unbelievable to threaten such reprisals for relatively minor territorial infringements or almost any level of terrorist attack. Whatever analysts might conclude on such questions, because there exists no discoverable frequency of pertinent past events, judgments of probability Israel’s planners could represent only what Oswald Spengler famously called “glorified belief” in . There are other problems. To function successfully, Israel’s nuclear deterrent, even after conspicuous removal from the “basement,” would have to appear secure from Iranian preemptive strikes. Accordingly, Israel would need to be especially wary of “decapitation,” of losing the “head” of its military command and control system as a result of Iranian strikes. If Iran should remain unpersuaded by Jerusalem’s sudden shift away from deliberate nuclear ambiguity, it could initiate non-nuclear strikes that weaken or eviscerate Israel’s These strikes could include use of radiation dispersal weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP). Also to be taken seriously by Jerusalem would be an Iranian and/or surrogate conventional missile attack on Israel’s nuclear reactor at In weighing different arguments concerning the effect of Palestine upon Israeli nuclear deterrence, specific attention should be directed toward (1) Israel’s presumptions about the imminence and longevity of unconventional war; and (2) Israel’s long-term expectations regarding Iranian strategic vulnerability. Should Israel’s leaders conclude that the creation of Palestine would make an imminent unconventional war more destructive and that Iranian vulnerability to Israeli strikes would diminish, Jerusalem’s inclination to strike massively against Iran could be increased. To a still-indecipherable extent, Israel’s tactical/operational judgments on striking first would be affected by antecedent decisions on nuclear strategy. these critical decisions would concern “counter value” vs. “counterforce” targeting issues. If Israel should opt for nuclear deterrence based on an “assured destruction” (“counter value”) strategy, Jerusalem would likely choose a relatively small number of weapons that might be relatively inaccurate. A “counterforce” strategy, on the other hand, would require a larger number of more accurate weapons, ordnance that could destroy even the most hardened enemy targets. To an extent, “going for counterforce” could render Israeli nuclear threats more credible. This conclusion would be based largely on the assumption that because the effects of war-fighting nuclear weapons would be more precise and controlled, they would also be more amenable to actual use. Already, this precise calculation animates Pakistan’s strategy vis-à-vis India. Other things being equal, openly war-fighting postures of Israeli nuclear deterrence would more likely encourage Israeli defensive strikes. If counterforce targeted nuclear weapons were ever fired, especially in a proliferated regional setting, the resultant escalation could produce extensive counter value nuclear exchanges. Even if such escalations were averted, the “collateral” effects of counterforce detonations could prove devastating. In making its nuclear choices, Israel will have to confront a paradox. Credible nuclear deterrence, essential to Israeli security and survival in a world made more dangerous by the creation of Palestine, would require “usable” nuclear weapons. If, after all, these weapons were patently inappropriate for any reasonable objective, they would not deter. At the same time, the more usable such nuclear weapons become in order to enhance nuclear deterrence, the more likely it is, at one time or another, they will actually be fired. While this paradox would seem to suggest the rationality of Israel deploying only the least-harmful forms of usable nuclear weapons, the fact that there could be no reliably coordinated agreements with Iran on deployable nuclear weapons points to a markedly different conclusion. Unless Israel were to calculate that more harmful weapons would produce greater hazards for its own population as well as for target populations, there would exist no tactical benefit to opting for the least injurious nuclear weapons. For the moment, at least, it appears that Israel has rejected any nuclear warfighting strategies of deterrence in favor of a still-implicit counter-value engagement posture. But this could change in response to the pace and direction of any ongoing Israel-Iran war and of Iranian nuclearization. In view of what is now generally recognized, there is every good reason to assume that Israel’s nuclear arsenal does exist and that Israel’s assorted enemies share this critical assumption. The most critical question about Israel’s nuclear deterrent, however, is not about , but . How likely is it that Israel, after launching non-nuclear strikes against Iranian hard targets would respond to enemy reprisals with a nuclear counter-retaliation? To answer this core question, Israel’s decision-makers will first have to put themselves into the shoes of pertinent Iranian leaders. Will these leaders calculate that they can afford to retaliate massively against Israel, i.e., that such retaliation would not produce a nuclear counter-retaliation? In asking this question, they will assume, of course, a non-nuclear retaliation against Israel. Depending upon the way in which the enemy decision-makers interpret Israel’s authoritative perceptions, they will accept or reject the cost-effectiveness of a non-nuclear retaliation against Israel. This means that it is likely in Israel’s best interests to communicate the following strategic assumption to all its existential enemies: . The plausibility of this assumption would be enhanced if enemy reprisals were to involve chemical, biological or EMP weapons. All such “glorified belief” calculations assume enemy rationality. In the absence of calculations that compare the costs and benefits of all strategic alternatives, what will happen in the imminent Israel-Iran must remain a matter of conjecture. The prospect of non-rational judgments in such a conflict is always plausible, especially as the influence of Islamist/ ideology could remain determinative among Iranian decisional elites. Still, various dangers of a nuclear war will obtain even among fully rational adversaries. This includes both deliberate nuclear war and inadvertent unclear war. Israel’s nuclear deterrent should always remain oriented toward dominating escalation at multiple and intersecting levels of conventional and unconventional enemy threats. For this to work, Israeli strategic planners should continuously bear in mind that intra-war operational success will depend on prior formulations of suitable national doctrine or strategic theory. In the end, the truest forms of Israeli power will have to reflect “a triumph of mind over mind,” not just of “mind over matter.” The most persuasive forms of military power on planet earth are not guns, battleships or missiles. Rather, they are believable promises of “life everlasting” or personal immortality When one finally uncovers what is most utterly important to the vast majority of human beings, this factor is a presumptive Lamentably, individuals all over the world too often regard the corrosive dynamics of belligerent nationalism as a preferred path to personal immortality. Why else, in essentially all global conflict ( national and -national) would each side seek so desperately align with God? Always, the loudest nationalistic claim is manipulatively reassuring: “Fear not,” the citizens and subjects are counseled, “God is on our side.” In our present analytic context, what promise could possibly prove more heartening to Israel’s enemies and more fearsome to Israel? Ultimately, Israel’s most compelling forms of strategic influence will derive not from high technology weaponry, but from the evident advantages of intellectual power. These always-overriding advantages must be explored and compared according to two very specific but overlapping criteria of assessment: law and strategy. In certain circumstances, these complex expectations might not be congruent or “in synch” with each other, but contradictory. Here, the underlying “mind over mind” challenges to Israel would become excruciatingly difficult; nonetheless, successful decision-making outcomes could still be kept in plain sight and remain sufficiently credible. What will be required will be a suitably theoretical appreciation of decisional complexity and a corresponding willingness to approach all relevant issues from convergent standpoints of science, intellect and dialectical analysis. In principle, at least, cumulative policy failures could produce broadly existential outcomes. Acknowledging this, Israel’s policy planners and decision–makers should strive to ensure that the beleaguered country’s nuclear deterrent could protect against large-scale non-nuclear attacks. A first step in reaching this assurance should be the systematic application of formal decision-theory to the “Iran problem,” a deductive task that would (1) not depend on historical precedent or data; and (2) give informed support to Israeli leadership decisions on nuclear deterrence and “escalation dominance.” For Israel, the primary battlefield with Iran should always be viewed as an intellectual rather than territorial arena. Despite recurrent threats of annihilation, Israel has never issued any expressly nuclear threats to Iran or its proxies. But present times are more strategically uncertain than ever before, and Israel’s optimal path to managing a catastrophic war with Iran should be to keep that threat non-nuclear. It follows that Jerusalem should prepare to use graduated nuclear threats against Iran . Among other things, this raises the prospect of a “limited nuclear war.” Immediately, to best ensure that Israeli paths to escalation dominance remain “navigable,” Jerusalem will need to implement far-reaching shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” For the moment, there would appear to be no more promising way to protect the Jewish State from an unconventional and eventually nuclear war with Iran. Such implementation could also serve Israel’s security needs vis-à-vis a nuclear North Korea functioning as Iranian military proxy, and prospectively-nuclear Sunni Arab states such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Though the rationale for Sunni state nuclearization would be national self-defense from a nearly-nuclear Shiite state adversary in Tehran, this does not mean that these Arab states would become “friends of Israel.” Instead, it could signal the beginnings of a worst-case scenario in which the still-beleaguered Jewish State would face similarly recalcitrant nuclear foes. Summing up all pertinent arguments, there is nothing about the recent collapse of Syria’s al-Assad regime that should diminish Israel’s protection efforts against a still-nuclearizing Iran. Quite the contrary. The author’s first comprehensive examination of this issue was: Louis René Beres, (1986). But see also more recent: Louis René Beres, (2016; 2 ed., 2018). Expressions of enemy irrationality could take different or overlapping forms. These include a disorderly or inconsistent value system; computational errors in calculation; an incapacity to communicate efficiently; random or haphazard influences in the making or transmittal of particular decisions; and the internal dissonance generated by any structure of collective decision-making (i.e., assemblies of pertinent individuals who lack identical value systems and/or whose organizational arrangements impact their willing capacity to act as a single or unitary national decision maker). See authoritative at BESA (Israel). Says Carl on Clausewitz: “Defensive warfare does not consist of waiting idly for things to happen. We must wait only if it brings us visible and decisive advantages. That calm before the storm, when the aggressor is gathering new forces for a great blow, is most dangerous for the defender.” (See 1812). A similarly timeless argument was made much earlier by ancient Chinese military thinker Sun-Tzu in “Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven. Thus they are able to preserve themselves and attain completer victory.” See also an by this writer, Louis René Beres, at Harvard Law School, . Such calculations would essentially be dialectical. The term “dialectical” originates from Greek expression for the art of conversation. A common contemporary meaning is method of seeking truth by correct reasoning. From the standpoint of shaping Israel’s intra-war deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Iran, the following operations should be regarded as essential but nonexclusive components: (1) a method of refutation conducted by examining logical consequences; (2) a method of division or repeated logical analysis of genera into species; (3) logical reasoning using premises that are probable or generally accepted; (4) formal logic; and (5) the logical development of thought through thesis and antithesis to fruitful synthesis of these opposites. In world politics and law, a state or insurgent-group is determinedly rational to the extent that its leadership always values collective survival more highly than any other conceivable preference or combination of preferences. An insurgent/terrorist force will not always display such a clarifying or “helpful” preference ordering. Pertinent “post-Syria” examples regarding Israel are assorted Sunni jihadists spawned or strengthened by al-Assad’s overthrow. In essence, these coalescing terror groups represent new variants of al-Qaeda and ISIS. See: Anatol Rapoport, (1964). Says Rapoport, in an early observation that now applies usefully to Israel, Iran and nuclear war avoidance: “Formal decision-theory does not depend on data.... The task of theory is confined to the construction of a deductive apparatus, to be used in deriving logically necessary conclusions from given assumptions.” See, for example, by this author: Louis René Beres, “Martyrdom and International Law,” , September 10, 2018; and Louis René Beres, “Religious Extremism and International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption and Irrationality,” Vol. 39, No.3., 2007-2008, pp. 709-730. See by this author, Louis René Beres, at INSS (Tel Aviv). Embedded in attempts to achieve this success would be variously credible threats of “assured destruction.” This term references ability to inflict “unacceptable damage” after absorbing an attacker’s first strike. In the traditional nuclear lexicon, (MAD) would describe a stand-off condition in which an assured destruction capacity is possessed by both (or all) opposing sides. would be those which target only an adversary’s strategic military facilities and supporting infrastructure. Such strategies could be dangerous not only because of the “collateral damage” they might produce, but also because they could heighten the likelihood of first-strike attacks. would refer to harms done to human and non-human resources as a consequence of strategic strikes directed at enemy forces or military facilities. Even such “unintended” damage could quickly involve large numbers of casualties/fatalities. In effect, Israel’s posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity was already breached by two of the country’s prime ministers, first, by Shimon Peres, on December 22, 1995, and second, by Ehud Olmert, on December 11, 2006. Peres, speaking to a group of Israeli newspaper and magazine editors, then stated publicly: “...give me peace, and we’ll give up the atom. That’s the whole story.” When, later, Olmert offered similarly general but also revelatory remarks, they were described widely (and benignly) as “slips of the tongue.” It’s now a very delicate regional balance of power for Israel to negotiate. For years, a Salafi/Deobandi (Sunni) Crescent has emerged to challenge the Shiite axis. With the fall of al-Assad in Syria, this axis has been weakened, most obviously Iran. At the same time, Iran will still find support in parts of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, while Israel will now have to deal with the potentially more problematic Sunni terrorists actively institutionalizing operations in Damascus. This lawful option can be found in customary international law. The most precise origins of in such authoritative law lie in the a case that concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. Following this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally justified certain militarily defensive actions. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an antecedent attack. Here, the jurisprudential framework permitted a military response to a so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” See: Beth M. Polebaum, “National Self-defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,” 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187, 190-91 (1984) (noting that the case had transformed the right of self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine). Still earlier, see: Hugo Grotius, 2 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925) (1625); and Emmerich de Vattel, , 3 Classics of International Law, 130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916) (1758). Also, Samuel Pufendorf, 32 (Frank Gardner Moore., tr., 1927 (1682). The Peace of Westphalia (1648) concluded the Thirty Years War and created the still-existing state system. See: , Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and , Oct. 1648, 1., Consol. T.S. 119. Together, these two treaties comprise the “Peace of Westphalia.” Incontestably, since this Peace put an end to the last of the major religious wars sparked by the Reformation, the “state system” has been ridden with evident strife and recurrent calamity. As a global “state of nature” characterized by interminable “war of all against all” (a the conspicuous legacy of Westphalia has proven disappointing. . The idea of a – an idea of which the nuclear-age is merely a modern variant – has never been more than facile metaphor. Oddly, it has never had anything to do with ascertaining equilibrium. As such, balance is always more-or-less a matter of individual subjective perception. Adversarial states can never be sufficiently confident that identifiable strategic circumstances are actually “balanced” in their favor. In consequence, each side must perpetually fear that it will be left behind, a fear creating ever-wider patterns of world system insecurity and disequilibrium. See the Declaration; Also to be considered as complementary in this connection is the (October 23, 2020) and (December 10, 2020). See David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, “ ,” Institute for Science and International Security (December 10, 2024). In essence, this technical report “sounds an alarm” that there is taking place “a dangerous increase in Iran’s enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment plant.” In principle, the existential dangers posed by Iran could be more-or-less effectively balanced by a new Sunni Arab nuclear capability in Riyadh, Cairo or Abu Dhabi. In that ironic circumstance, Jerusalem might conclude that certain expressions of selective Arab nuclearization would represent a helpful or even benign development. In the longer term view, however, Jerusalem would be forced to decide which particular adversary or pair of adversaries was potentially more intolerable, and whether or not some form of preemption might sometime be required. Seventeenth-century English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, instructs that although international relations (the state of nations) is in the state of nature, it is nonetheless more tolerable than the condition of individual men in nature. This is because, with individual human beings, “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest.” Now, with the advent of nuclear weapons, there is no reason to believe that the state of nations remains more tolerable. Rather, nuclear weapons are bringing the state of nations closer to the true Hobbesian state of nature. See, also, David P. Gauthier, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 207. As with Hobbes, Pufendorf argues that the state of nations is not quite as intolerable as the state of nature between individuals. The state of nations, reasons Pufendorf, “lacks those inconveniences which are attendant upon a pure state of nature....” And similarly, Spinoza suggests “that a commonwealth can guard itself against being subjugated by another, as a man in the state of nature cannot do.” See, A.G. Wernham, ed., , iii, II (Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 295. See For much earlier original writings by this author on the prospective impact of a Palestinian state on Israeli nuclear deterrence, see: Louis René Beres, “Security Threats and Effective Remedies: Israel’s Strategic, Tactical and Legal Options,” Ariel Center for Policy Research (Israel), ACPR Policy Paper No. 102, April 2000, 110 pp; Louis René Beres, “After the `Peace Process:’ Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 15, No. 2., Winter 1997, pp. 301-335; Louis René Beres, “Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and Dangers to Israel of False Hope,” ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Vol. 23., No. 4., Summer 1997, pp. 539-568; Louis René Beres, “Getting Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Israel, Intelligence and False Hope,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Vol. 10., No. 1., Spring 1997, pp. 75-90; Louis René Beres, “On Living in a Bad Neighborhood: The Informed Argument for Israeli Nuclear Weapons,” POLITICAL CROSSROADS, Vol. 5., Nos. 1/2, 1997, pp. 143-157; Louis René Beres, “Facing the Apocalypse: Israel and the `Peace Process,’” BTZEDEK: THE JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE JEWISH COMMENTARY (Israel), Vol. 1., No. 3., Fall/Winter 1997, pp. 32-35; Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “Why Golan Demilitarization Would Not Work,” STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. XXIV, No. 1., Winter 1996, pp. 75-76; Louis René Beres, “Implications of a Palestinian State for Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 17., No. 2., 1999, pp. 229-286; Louis René Beres, “A Palestinian State and Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” CROSSROADS: AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIO-POLITICAL JOURNAL, No. 31, 1991, pp. 97-104; Louis René Beres, “The Question of Palestine and Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 62, No. 4., October-December 1991, pp. 451-460; Louis René Beres, “Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War,” BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, Vol. 22., No. 2., June 1991, pp. 227-234; Louis René Beres, “A Palestinian State: Implications for Israel’s Security and the Possibility of Nuclear War,” BULLETIN OF THE JERUSALEM INSTITUTE FOR WESTERN DEFENCE (Israel), Vol. 4., Bulletin No, 3., October 1991, pp. 3-10; Louis René Beres, ISRAELI SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 1/1990, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 40 pp; and Louis René Beres, “After the Gulf War: Israel, Palestine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East,” STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. XIX, No. 4., Fall 1991, pp. 48-55. Contending Palestinian authorities still remain unable to meet variously codified expectations of statehood identified at the 1934 . This “Montevideo Convention” is the treaty governing statehood in all applicable international law. Jurisprudentially, Palestine still remains a “Non-Member Observer State.” The argument that a Palestinian state would be more benign because it could be “demilitarized” is unsupportable in strategic, political or jurisprudential terms. See, by this writer, Louis René Beres, “Why the Allen Plan and Palestinian Demilitarization Could Never Protect Israel,” 16 July, 2017. Earlier law journal articles on this limitation, co-authored with former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Zalman Shoval, include: Louis René Beres and Zalman Shoval, “Why a Demilitarized Palestinian State Would not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under International Law,” Winter 1998, pp. 347-363; and Louis René Beres and Zalman Shoval, “On Demilitarizing a Palestinian `Entity’ and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective,” , Vol. 28, No.5., 1995m pp. 959-972. The modern philosophic origins of “will” are discoverable in the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer, especially (1818). For his own inspiration, Schopenhauer drew upon Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Later, Friedrich Nietzsche drew just as importantly upon Arthur Schopenhauer. Goethe was also a core intellectual source for Spanish existentialist Jose Ortega y’Gasset, author of the singularly prophetic twentieth-century work, ( ;1930). See, accordingly, Ortega’s very grand essay, “In Search of Goethe from Within” (1932), written for of Berlin on the centenary of Goethe’s death. It is reprinted in Ortega’s anthology, (1948) and is available from Princeton University Press (1968). “I believe,” says Oswald Spengler in his magisterial (1918), “is the one great word against metaphysical fear.” “Military doctrine” is not the same as “military strategy.” Doctrine “sets the stage” for strategy. It identifies various central beliefs that must subsequently animate any actual “order of battle.” Among other things, describes underlying general principles on how a particular war ought to be waged. The reciprocal task for is to adapt as required in order to best support previously-fashioned military doctrine. In world politics, says philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, any deeply-felt promise of immortality must be of “transcendent importance.” See his 1927. In the nineteenth century, in his posthumously published lecture on Politics (1896), German historian Heinrich von Treitschke observed: “Individual man sees in his own country the realization of his earthly immortality.” Earlier, German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel opined, in his (1820), that the state represents “the march of God in the world.” The “deification” of a transformation from mere principle of action to a sacred end in itself, drew its originating strength from the doctrine of sovereignty advanced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Initially conceived as a principle of internal order, this doctrine underwent a specific metamorphosis, whence it became the formal or justifying rationale for international anarchy – that is, for the global “state of nature.” First established by Jean Bodin as a juristic concept in (1576), sovereignty came to be regarded as a power absolute and above the law. Understood in terms of modern international relations, this doctrine encouraged the notion that states lie above and beyond any form of legal regulation in their interactions with each other. At the same time, strategists cannot be allowed to forget, that theoretical fruitfulness must be achieved at some more-or-less tangible costs of “dehumanization.” Accordingly, Goethe reminds in , the original fragment: “All theory, dear friend, is grey, And the golden tree of life is green.” Translated by Professor Beres from the German: In the words of Jose Ortega y’Gasset: “Science, by which I mean the entire body of knowledge about things, whether corporeal or spiritual, is as much a work of imagination as it is of observation.... The latter is not possible without the former.” ( 1958). This does not mean trying to account for absolutely every pertinent explanatory variable. Clarifications can be found at “Occam’s Razor” or the “principle of parsimony.” This stipulates preference for the simplest explanation still consistent with scientific method. Regarding current concerns for Israel’s nuclear strategy, it suggests, , that the country’s military planners not seek to identify and examine every seemingly important variable, but rather to “say the most, with the least.” This presents an important and often neglected cautionary, because all too often, policy-makers and planners mistakenly attempt to be too inclusive. This attempt unwittingly distracts them from forging more efficient and “parsimonious” strategic theories. See: RESOLUTION ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631, 1975, 13 I.L.M. 710, 1974; and CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 51. Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, Bevans 1153, 1976, Y.B.U.N. 1043 See by this author at BESA (Israel), Louis René Beres. For a coherent and comprehensive summation, see recent by Yaakov Lapin. World court established at The Hague On December 13, 1920, the League of Nations Assembly, sitting in Geneva, approved the statute setting up the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.Learn more about the . Visit the website of the Permanent Court's successor body, the . President Wilson arrives in France to negotiate WWI treaty On December 13, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson arrived in France to negotiate a treaty to conclude World War I. Wilson was the first US President to visit Europe while in office. His meeting with the other Allied leaders would result in the , which created the League of Nations and redrew borders across Europe. The treaty, however, was rejected by the US Senate, thus preventing the U.S. from joining the League with the other major powers.

Drones, planes or UFOs? Americans abuzz over mysterious New Jersey sightingsWASHINGTON (AP) — President-elect Donald Trump’s allies on Capitol Hill rallied around Pete Hegseth , Trump’s Pentagon pick, on Thursday even as new details surfaced about allegations that he had sexually assaulted a woman in 2017. The GOP embrace of Hegseth came as another controversial Trump nominee, Matt Gaetz, withdrew from consideration for attorney general. Gaetz said it was clear he had become a “distraction" amid pressure on the House to release an ethics report about allegations of his own sexual misconduct. An attorney for two women has said that his clients told House Ethics Committee investigators that Gaetz paid them for sex on multiple occasions beginning in 2017, when Gaetz was a Florida congressman. Fresh questions over the two nominees' pasts, and their treatment of women, arose with Republicans under pressure from Trump and his allies to quickly confirm his Cabinet. At the same time, his transition has so far balked at the vetting and background checks that have traditionally been required. While few Republican senators have publicly criticized any of Trump's nominees, it became clear after Gaetz's withdrawal that many had been harboring private concerns about him. Oklahoma Sen. Markwayne Mullin, who served with Gaetz in the House, said it was a “positive move.” Mississippi Sen. Roger Wicker said it was a “positive development.” Maine Sen. Susan Collins said Gaetz “put country first and I am pleased with his decision.” After meeting with Hegseth, though, Republicans rallied around him. “I think he’s going to be in pretty good shape,” said Wicker, who is expected to chair the Senate Armed Services Committee in the next Congress. Republican senators' careful words, and their early reluctance to publicly question Trump's picks, illustrated not only their fear of retribution from the incoming president but also some of their hopes that the confirmation process can proceed normally, with proper vetting and background checks that could potentially disqualify problematic nominees earlier. Gaetz withdrew after meeting with senators on Wednesday. Sen. Thom Tillis said Gaetz was “in a pressure cooker” when he decided to withdraw, but suggested that it would have little bearing on Trump’s other nominees. “Transactions — one at a time,” he said. As the Hegseth nomination proceeds, Republicans also appear to be betting that they won't face much backlash for publicly setting aside the allegations of sexual misconduct — especially after Trump won election after being found liable for sexual abuse last year. Hegseth held a round of private meetings alongside incoming Vice President JD Vance on Thursday in an attempt to shore up support and told reporters afterward: “The matter was fully investigated and I was completely cleared, and that’s where I’m gonna leave it.” A 22-page police report report made public late Wednesday offered the first detailed account of the allegations against him. A woman told police that she was sexually assaulted in 2017 by Hegseth after he took her phone, blocked the door to a California hotel room and refused to let her leave. The report cited police interviews with the alleged victim, a nurse who treated her, a hotel staffer, another woman at the event and Hegseth. Hegseth’s lawyer, Timothy Palatore, said the incident was “fully investigated and police found the allegations to be false.” Hegseth paid the woman in 2023 as part of a confidential settlement to head off the threat of what he described as a baseless lawsuit, Palatore has said. Wicker played down the allegations against Hegseth, a former Fox News host, saying that “since no charges were brought from the authorities, we only have press reports.” Sen. Bill Hagerty, R-Tenn., said after his meeting with Hegseth that he "shared with him the fact that I was saddened by the attacks that are coming his way.” Hagerty dismissed the allegations as “a he-said, she-said thing” and called it a “shame” that they were being raised at all. The senator said attention should instead be focused on the Defense Department that Hegseth would head. It's one of the most complex parts of the federal government with more than 3 million employees, including military service members and civilians. Sexual assault has been a persistent problem in the military, though Pentagon officials have been cautiously optimistic they are seeing a decline in reported sexual assaults among active-duty service members and the military academies. Wyoming Sen. John Barrasso, who will be the No. 2 Republican in the Senate next year, said after his meeting with Hegseth that the nominee is a strong candidate who “pledged that the Pentagon will focus on strength and hard power – not the current administration’s woke political agenda.” Senate Republicans are under pressure to hold hearings once they take office in January and confirm nominees as soon as Trump is inaugurated, despite questions about whether Trump’s choices will be properly screened or if some, like Hegseth, have enough experience for the job. Senate Armed Services Chairman Jack Reed, who will be the top Democrat on the panel next year, said the reports on Hegseth “emphasized the need for a thorough investigation by the FBI on the background of all the nominees.” It takes a simple majority to approve Cabinet nominations, meaning that if Democrats all opposed a nominee, four Republican senators would also have to defect for any Trump choice to be defeated. Trump has made clear he’s willing to put maximum pressure on Senate Republicans to give him the nominees he wants – even suggesting at one point that they allow him to just appoint his nominees with no Senate votes. But senators insist, for now, that they are not giving up their constitutional power to have a say. “The president has the right to make the nominations that he sees fit, but the Senate also has a responsibility for advice and consent,” said Republican Sen. Mike Rounds of South Dakota. In the case of Gaetz, he said, “I think there was advice offered rather than consent.”Cynthia Erivo and Ariana Grande were paid equal salaries for their respective roles in “Wicked,” Page Six can confirm. “Reports of pay disparity between Cynthia and Ariana are completely false and based on internet fodder. The women received equal pay for their work on ‘Wicked,'” a spokesperson for Universal Pictures said in a statement to us Tuesday. The confirmation comes after rumors spread on social media that the “We Can’t Be Friends (Wait for Your Love)” singer, 31, was paid a whopping $15 million for her supporting role as Glinda, while Erivo, 37, made only $1 million to lead as Elphaba. Fans expressed their disappointment in the alleged pay disparity, with one X user writing , “Ariana getting paid $15m and Cynthia getting paid $1m is diabolical.” “The disparity between Ariana’s salary ($15 mil) and Cynthia’s is crazy because why is it that much of a difference? And they’re both named leads in the film,” another added . A third fan called the rumor “sick,” while one more said it was “insane.” While many people were upset by the gossip, several argued that Grande has a much bigger name and would draw a larger audience. Neither Grande nor Erivo has publicly commented on the unsubstantiated rumors. Page Six has reached out to their reps for comment. The pair were cast in “Wicked” in 2021 and formed a close friendship and partnership during filming. Erivo told Elle earlier this month that she feels she “gained a sister” in Grande and said they were both “blown away by how connected [they] were immediately” when they met. They were then able to deepen their connection through “hard” and vulnerable conversations throughout the filming process, she explained. Meanwhile, during a recent chat with the New York Times, Grande gushed that she “had a friend every step of the way” through the experience. “I’m really proud of us for how genuinely we took care of each other throughout this whole time,” she added. “Wicked” premiered Friday and led the third-biggest opening weekend of the year with $114 million domestically and $164.2 million globally. “Wicked: Part Two” is scheduled to premiere in theaters on Nov. 21, 2025.

Trump wants pardoned real estate developer Charles Kushner to become US ambassador to France

Washington, Dec 1 (PTI) President-elect Donald Trump on Saturday warned BRICS countries against any move to replace the US dollar and has sought a commitment from the nine-member group that includes India, Russia, China, and Brazil. BRICS, formed in 2009, is the only major international group of which the United States is not a part. Its other members are South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. Over the past few years a few of its member countries, in particular Russia and China, are seeking an alternative to the US Dollar or create own BRICS currency. India has so far not been part of the move. Also Read | Bangladesh: ISKCON Claims Arrest of 2 More Monks, Ranganath Das Brahmachari and Chinmoy Krishna Das' Assistant Adipurush Shyamdas Without Warrant Amid Row. On Saturday, Trump warned BRICS nations against such a move. “The idea that the BRICS Countries are trying to move away from the Dollar while we stand by and watch is OVER,” the president-elect said in a post on Truth Social, a platform owned by him. Also Read | Gautam Adani Breaks Silence on US Fraud Charges, Says 'Every Attack Makes Us Stronger, Every Obstacle Becomes Stepping Stone for More Resilient Adani Group'. “We require a commitment from these Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other Currency to replace the mighty U.S. Dollar or, they will face 100% Tariffs and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful U.S. Economy,” Trump warned. “They can go find another 'sucker!' There is no chance that the BRICS will replace the US Dollar in International Trade, and any Country that tries should wave goodbye to America,” he said. At the 2023 summit in South Africa, BRICS countries committed to study the feasibility of a new common currency. A proposal in this regard was made by the Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva. India, an important pillar of BRICS, has said it is against de-dollarisation. "...ask you about de-Dollarization as a possibility for the world. At times India has expressed interest in alternative currency. It can serve as a reserve mechanism. I wonder how do you see that right now what you see as the role of the dollar and these discussions about your national policy? India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said during his appearance at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace this fall. “I think you have us confused for someone else because we have never actively targeted the dollar. That's not part of either our economic policy or our political or our strategic policy. Some others may have,” Jaishankar said. “What I will tell you is a natural concern there. We often have trade partners who do not have dollars to take. So, we now have to look at whether we forgo dealings with them or do we find some settlement which works otherwise. So, there's no, I can say malicious intent vis-a-vis the dollar in business. WE are trying to do our business,” he said. “Sometimes you make it difficult in the use of dollars. We have some trade partners with whom trade in dollars becomes difficult because of your policies. We have to obviously look for workarounds. But for us, as we spoke about rebalancing, we spoke about multiple obviously all of this is also going to reflect on currencies and economic needs,” said the External Affairs Minister on October 1 this year. (This is an unedited and auto-generated story from Syndicated News feed, LatestLY Staff may not have modified or edited the content body)EAGAN, Minn. (AP) — Minnesota Vikings linebacker Ivan Pace Jr. has been placed on injured reserve after hurting his hamstring Sunday in a 30-27 overtime victory over the Chicago Bears. The move announced Tuesday means that Pace must miss at least the Vikings next four games. The Vikings also activated outside linebacker Gabriel Murphy from injured reserve and signed linebacker Jamin Davis off the Green Bay Packers practice squad. Pace, 23, had started each of the Vikings nine games this season. The 2023 undrafted free agent from Cincinnati had 56 tackles — including six for loss — and three sacks. Murphy, 24, signed with the Vikings as an undrafted free agent this spring. He was placed on injured reserve Aug. 27. Davis had joined the Packers practice squad Oct. 29 after getting released by the Washington Commanders a week earlier. Washington selected him out of Kentucky with the 19th overall pick in the 2021 draft. The 25-year-old Davis has 282 tackles, seven sacks, one interception, two forced fumble recoveries and two forced fumbles in his NFL career. He led the Commanders with a career-high 104 tackles in 2022. The Vikings (9-2) host the Arizona Cardinals (6-5) on Sunday. AP NFL: https://apnews.com/hub/NFL

NoneThe exit poll results have sparked a debate among leaders of the two major political alliances in the state. While the ruling Mahayuti alliance received the outcomes positively, leaders of the opposition Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) rejected it. Reacting to the exit polls, Shiv Sena MP Sanjay Raut termed it a fraud and confidently claimed that the MVA would form the government with 160 seats. Raut cited an example of the Lok Sabha election where the exit polls predicted 400 seats to NDA. Even in Haryana the exit polls gave 60 seats to the Congress, he reminded. Meanwhile, senior BJP leader and Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis refused to speak on the issue. But he said the Mahayuti has an edge and it was going to form the next government. Soon after the exit polls, the issue of the next chief minister also figured in the reactions by the leaders. The state Congress chief Nana Patole said the Congress-led MVA government will be formed in the state. The trends suggest that Congress will get the maximum number of seats, Patole said. But, his statement was not well received by the allies of the MVA. Sena MP Raut said the chief ministerial face will be decided by the alliance partners. “If the Congress high command has told Nana Patole that he was going to be the chief minister's face then the Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge, the party senior leaders such as Rahul Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi Vadra should announce the same,” Raut has reported to have said. Meanwhile, reacting to a question regarding the next CM, Deputy CM Devendra Fadnavis in Nagpur said there was no discussion about the CM post at the moment. The Mahayuti leaders will sit together and decide after the results are out. BJP candidate from Colaba assembly and State Legislative Assembly speaker Rahul Narvekar on Thursday expressed confidence that Mahayuti would form the government. “Everyone is independent to think whether the exit polls are accurate or not. Everything will be clear on November 23. We will win by double margin this year,” he said. Reacting on the exit poll predictions, MLA Bachhu Kadu of the Prahar Janshakti Party said no government can be formed without his support. The party is part of the third front of which ex MP Sambhaji Raje Chhatrapati is also associated. Minister Deepak Kesrakar from the Eknath Shinde led Shiv Sena has said that if needed the Mahayuti can take support of the independent MLAs to form the government. It is said that the senior leaders of the Mahayuti have approached probable winners who have fought the election as an independent. Sanjay Shirsat, spokesperson of the Shinde-led Sena has said that Eknath Shinde will take a decision if denied the CM's post. When he was asked if Shinde decided to ally with Sharad Pawar for the CM's post, Shirsat said whichever decision he may take the MLAs will be with him.

The Vikings have had starting inside linebackers Ivan Pace Jr. and Blake Cashman together for just six of 11 games this season, and now they’ll be without Pace for at least another four games. Pace was placed on injured reserve Tuesday because of the hamstring strain he suffered in the first quarter of Sunday’s win in Chicago. He left after five plays. He’ll now miss at least games against the Cardinals, Falcons, Bears and Seahawks. The earliest he can return is Dec. 29 vs. Green Bay. The Vikings signed fourth-year linebacker Jamin Davis off the Packers practice squad and to the active roster, joining Cashman, Kamu Grugier-Hill and Brian Asamoah on the depth chart. “We really feel for him,” Cashman said after Sunday’s win . “Hate to see one of your guys get injured. We gotta lean on him, be there for him, and we’re going to need him to get right because we have playoff football ahead.” Pace, the second-year undrafted linebacker, ranks third on the team with 59 combined tackles despite also missing two games earlier this season because of a knee injury. He also has three sacks and a fumble returned for a touchdown during the Oct. 20 loss to the Lions. The Vikings added Davis, a 25-year-old former first-round pick by the Washington Commanders. He spent the past month on Green Bay’s practice squad, where the Vikings acquired him from, after he had been released by Washington in October. Davis, drafted 19th overall out of Kentucky in 2021, was mostly an off-the-ball linebacker for the Commanders over three seasons, when he had seven sacks, six pass deflections and an interception in 36 starts. Washington used Davis sparingly on the defensive line this season before he was cut. Defensive coordinator Brian Flores has previously used a committee approach to fill linebacker absences. Cashman missed three games due to turf toe as well. The Vikings leaned on 30-year-old veteran Grugier-Hill, who has played 138 defensive snaps, and safety Josh Metellus, among others, to fill the void.Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce's Biggest Relationship Moments of 2024

Hezbollah fires 200 rockets at northern, central Israel, injuring eightSyra Health to Present at NobleCon20IOWA CITY — Jahmal Banks let out a deep breath that would have been visible a few minutes earlier on the Kinnick Stadium field as the pom-pom atop his red stocking cap bobbed. What’s left? The Nebraska senior receiver hadn’t really considered it yet. His spirits — not to mention body temperature — were too down in the moments after another walk-off loss to Iowa. Regular season over, with this fifth defeat in six games stinging more as the numbness began to wear off. “Get better,” Banks said finally. “Craft. At the end of the day, it’s still football. For the people who are going to be with us, we’ll give everything we have. And just keep going.” The day after the Iowa game has been Blacker Saturday for Nebraska for most of the last decade. It usually marks the end of games and the beginning of an offseason of reflection and roster change while other teams play in December and January. People are also reading... These Huskers will be busier. Early signing day moved up even earlier this cycle from mid-December to Wednesday and NU — at 19 known commits into the weekend and potential targets still in the balance — will try to close better than it did in Iowa City. The transfer portal opens Dec. 9 and coach Matt Rhule has said he expects upwards of 50 players to enter as the program begins to trim its roster from 150-plus on the way to next year’s mandated maximum size of 105. Of course, Nebraska will be an active shopper in the free-agent market, too. Nebraska's Dylan Raiola runs with the ball against Iowa on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Unlike the past seven seasons, though, bowl season will also include a Nebraska bowl game. A year ago the matchups for possible bowls the Huskers are contenders for now — including the Music City, Guaranteed Rate, Pinstripe, GameAbove Sports and Duke’s Mayo — were announced the Sunday after conference championship weekend. That gives NU a full week to chew on yet another one-score loss before it has an opponent for which to prepare. While a crowd of Iowa players reveled in boisterous extended postgame interviews, only a few Huskers spoke. Those brief sessions — for just a few minutes each as the team hurried to pack up and return to Lincoln — were more about the future than the painful immediate past. Quarterback Dylan Raiola — like his new offensive coordinator, Dana Holgorsen — said he knew he would take at least a day or two off. “I’m not really sure what’s going to happen next, what bowl we’re going to or what’s going on,” the freshman said. “We’ll figure that out soon.” Senior defensive lineman Ty Robinson wore a straight face as he considered that his sixth and final college season would last longer than any of the others. Even with a likely NFL future coming, don’t count him as part of the modern trend of postseason opt-outs “Come back on Monday,” Robinson said. “It’s new for me so I don’t really know what to expect. I’m excited to be a part of it, though. I love this program. I love that I get to be able to practice and play football for the next few weeks and get to go to a bowl game.” Rhule — as angry as he was upset late Friday — said the Iowa result should “probably bother people” for a while. It should fester with younger players who will be back in red inside Kinnick Stadium in 2026. At some point, he said, Nebraska needs to finish. Chasing three points was the program’s season-long motto and ultimately the Hawkeyes were the ones who caught the triple. “It’s just where we’re at, you know what I mean?” Rhule said. “As dumb as that sounds, we have to get better. Have to get better.” Nebraska has objectively improved in areas from the beginning of the year. The defense was dominant save for one disastrous sequence on the 72-yard touchdown that began with a swing pass to Iowa running back Kaleb Johnson and included five missed tackles. The offense under Holgorsen moved and controlled the ball. But the shortcomings were on display, too. The Huskers forced no takeaways for a second time in November. Too many potential big plays on offense went unmade or unseen. Special teams featured another catastrophic moment on the muffed punt and a series of lesser miscues that consistently tilted field position toward the Hawkeyes. Friday wasn’t the season finale this time. Even it felt like it in the cold. “Losing this game doesn’t do justice to see all the success and the strides we’ve made as a team,” Raiola said. “But that’s what it is right now.” Photos: Nebraska football vs. Iowa on Black Friday — Nov. 29 Nebraska players, including Jacob Hood (center), turn to wave during the "Hawkeye Wave" on Friday in Iowa City. Nebraska assistant coach Garret McGuire looks on during warm up before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska assistant coach Marcus Satterfield looks on during warm up before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska fan Zachary Roth of Omaha dances in the cold during the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska head coach Matt Rhule talks with an official during the Iowa game on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Nebraska's Jahmal Banks is tackled by Iowa's TJ Hall on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Iowa's Kamari Moulton (center) is tackled by Nebraska's MJ Sherman (left) and Elijah Jeudy, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Carter Nelson (center) is tackled by Iowa's Deontae Craig (right) on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Iowa's Quinn Schulte (left) tackles Nebraska's Nate Boerkircher, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Thomas Fidone picks up a pass against Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's John Hohl reacts after missing a field goal against Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Dylan Raiola runs with the ball against Iowa on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Nebraska's Isaac Gifford (left) rips the ball away from Iowa's Jarriett Buie on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. The Nebraska defense stops Iowa on fourth down on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Nebraska's Jahmal Banks picks up a pass next to Iowa's Deshaun Lee, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Emmett Johnson escapes a tackle by Iowa's Deshaun Lee, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska head coach Matt Rhule looks on during the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Dante Dowdell tries to break a tackle from Iowa's Jay Higgins (left) and Koen Entringer (4), Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Emmett Johnson fumbles under pressure from Iowa's Sebastian Castro (top) and TJ Hall (bottom), Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Iowa's Drew Stevens (18) celebrates after making the game-winning kick against Nebraska, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Iowa's Drew Stevens (18) celebrates after making the game-winning kick against Nebraska, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Iowa's Luke Elkin (left) and Ty Nissen carry Heroes Game trophy after defeating Nebraska on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Iowa's Drew Stevens (18) kicks a game-winning field goal through the arms of Nebraska's Ty Robinson (9) and Nash Hutmacher (0) on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Nebraska's Dante Dowdell scores a touchdown against Iowa in the second quarter, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Dylan Raiola carries the ball against Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Iowa's Deontae Craig (bottom) pressures Nebraska's Dylan Raiola, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's John Hohl (right) celebrates his field goal against Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Mikai Gbayor tips a pass by Iowa's Jackson Stratton on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Iowa's Deontae Craig (left) and Aaron Graves (right) pressure Nebraska's Dylan Raiola on at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska head coach Matt Rhule (left) talks with Iowa head coach Kirk Ferentz before the game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Jesse Divis of David City, 17, braves the cold before the Nebraska game at Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska head coach Matt Rhule arrives before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska special teams coordinator Ed Foley arrives before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Dylan Raiola arrives before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. The Nebraska football team arrives arrives at Kinnick Stadium before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, in Iowa City, Iowa. The Nebraska football team arrives arrives at Kinnick Stadium before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska offensive coordinator Dana Holgorsen arrives at Kinnick Stadium before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, in Iowa City, Iowa. Subscribe for the best Husker news & commentary Be the first to know Get local news delivered to your inbox!

Seagate Technology Holdings PLC stock underperforms Thursday when compared to competitors despite daily gainsLiberal MP accuses opposition MPs of wasting time on another Boissonnault probe

How Trump's bet on voters electing him managed to silence some of his legal woesPrincipal Financial Group Inc. decreased its holdings in shares of Zscaler, Inc. ( NASDAQ:ZS – Free Report ) by 1.0% during the 3rd quarter, according to its most recent 13F filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The firm owned 7,902 shares of the company’s stock after selling 76 shares during the period. Principal Financial Group Inc.’s holdings in Zscaler were worth $1,351,000 at the end of the most recent reporting period. Other large investors have also modified their holdings of the company. DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale lifted its position in shares of Zscaler by 7.1% during the 3rd quarter. DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale now owns 221,212 shares of the company’s stock valued at $37,495,000 after acquiring an additional 14,701 shares during the period. Creative Planning boosted its position in Zscaler by 7.6% during the third quarter. Creative Planning now owns 148,534 shares of the company’s stock worth $25,390,000 after purchasing an additional 10,551 shares in the last quarter. Massachusetts Financial Services Co. MA acquired a new stake in Zscaler in the second quarter valued at $25,287,000. Strategic Advisors LLC increased its position in shares of Zscaler by 470.0% in the third quarter. Strategic Advisors LLC now owns 8,140 shares of the company’s stock valued at $1,391,000 after buying an additional 6,712 shares in the last quarter. Finally, Van ECK Associates Corp raised its stake in shares of Zscaler by 1,786.5% during the 3rd quarter. Van ECK Associates Corp now owns 15,073 shares of the company’s stock worth $2,728,000 after buying an additional 14,274 shares during the last quarter. 46.45% of the stock is owned by hedge funds and other institutional investors. Analyst Upgrades and Downgrades A number of analysts recently commented on ZS shares. Piper Sandler dropped their price objective on Zscaler from $255.00 to $215.00 and set an “overweight” rating for the company in a research report on Wednesday, September 4th. Wedbush cut their price objective on shares of Zscaler from $260.00 to $220.00 and set an “outperform” rating for the company in a research report on Wednesday, September 4th. UBS Group decreased their target price on shares of Zscaler from $270.00 to $250.00 and set a “buy” rating on the stock in a research report on Wednesday, September 4th. Loop Capital cut their price target on Zscaler from $180.00 to $165.00 and set a “hold” rating for the company in a report on Wednesday, September 4th. Finally, Needham & Company LLC decreased their price objective on Zscaler from $290.00 to $235.00 and set a “strong-buy” rating on the stock in a report on Wednesday, September 4th. Ten analysts have rated the stock with a hold rating, twenty-three have assigned a buy rating and one has assigned a strong buy rating to the company. According to MarketBeat.com, the stock currently has a consensus rating of “Moderate Buy” and a consensus target price of $218.55. Insider Transactions at Zscaler In other Zscaler news, CFO Remo Canessa sold 8,455 shares of Zscaler stock in a transaction that occurred on Tuesday, September 17th. The shares were sold at an average price of $171.28, for a total value of $1,448,172.40. Following the transaction, the chief financial officer now owns 231,793 shares in the company, valued at approximately $39,701,505.04. The trade was a 3.52 % decrease in their ownership of the stock. The transaction was disclosed in a filing with the SEC, which can be accessed through this hyperlink . Also, insider Robert Schlossman sold 1,435 shares of the firm’s stock in a transaction on Wednesday, October 9th. The stock was sold at an average price of $181.70, for a total value of $260,739.50. Following the sale, the insider now directly owns 105,806 shares of the company’s stock, valued at approximately $19,224,950.20. This represents a 1.34 % decrease in their ownership of the stock. The disclosure for this sale can be found here . In the last 90 days, insiders have sold 30,502 shares of company stock valued at $5,256,651. Corporate insiders own 19.20% of the company’s stock. Zscaler Stock Up 1.8 % ZS opened at $210.96 on Friday. The firm has a market cap of $32.17 billion, a price-to-earnings ratio of -527.39 and a beta of 0.82. The company’s 50-day moving average price is $186.49 and its 200 day moving average price is $183.60. Zscaler, Inc. has a fifty-two week low of $153.45 and a fifty-two week high of $259.61. Zscaler ( NASDAQ:ZS – Get Free Report ) last issued its quarterly earnings data on Tuesday, September 3rd. The company reported ($0.05) earnings per share (EPS) for the quarter, topping analysts’ consensus estimates of ($0.14) by $0.09. Zscaler had a negative return on equity of 3.46% and a negative net margin of 2.66%. The business had revenue of $592.90 million during the quarter, compared to analyst estimates of $567.46 million. During the same period in the prior year, the company posted ($0.17) EPS. The business’s revenue for the quarter was up 30.3% compared to the same quarter last year. Research analysts anticipate that Zscaler, Inc. will post -0.95 earnings per share for the current year. About Zscaler ( Free Report ) Zscaler, Inc operates as a cloud security company worldwide. The company offers Zscaler Internet Access solution that provides users, workloads, IoT, and OT devices secure access to externally managed applications, including software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications and internet destinations; and Zscaler Private Access solution, which is designed to provide access to managed applications hosted internally in data centers, and private or public clouds. Further Reading Five stocks we like better than Zscaler What is a Stock Market Index and How Do You Use Them? Vertiv’s Cool Tech Makes Its Stock Red-Hot What is a Dividend Harvesting Strategy and How Can Investors Profit from it? MarketBeat Week in Review – 11/18 – 11/22 Election Stocks: How Elections Affect the Stock Market 2 Finance Stocks With Competitive Advantages You Can’t Ignore Want to see what other hedge funds are holding ZS? Visit HoldingsChannel.com to get the latest 13F filings and insider trades for Zscaler, Inc. ( NASDAQ:ZS – Free Report ). 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